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WHY THERE IS NO DUTY TO PAY DAMAGES:    
POWERS, DUTIES, AND PRIVATE LAW 
NATHAN B. OMAN*
ABSTRACT
 This Article was part of a symposium on the rise of civil recourse theory. It contributes to 
this debate by defending a simple but counterintuitive claim: There is no duty to pay dam-
ages in either tort or contract law. The absence of such a duty provides a reason for believing 
that civil recourse provides a better account of private law than does corrective justice. Cor-
rective justice is committed to interpreting private law as creating duties for wrongdoers to 
compensate their victims. In contrast, civil recourse sees the law as empowering plaintiffs 
against defendants. My argument is that a careful analysis of the doctrines surrounding 
pleading, payment of damages, accord and satisfaction, and judgments reveals that our law 
gives plaintiffs the power to extract wealth from defendants but does not impose duties on 
defendants to compensate those that they have wronged. The structure of my argument is 
borrowed from a much older exchange between Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who thought 
that contract law imposed a duty to perform or pay damages, and Frederick Pollock, who 
denied that the payment of damages was part of the duty to keep a contract. I side with Pol-
lock against Holmes and think that the Englishman’s argument provides a useful model in 
the debate between corrective justice and civil recourse. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 It is a good time to be a theorist of the private law. After a period 
during which the manifest power of economic analysis of torts and 
contract seemed to have driven most other approaches into the shad-
ows, philosophically minded lawyers and law professors (and a few 
legally minded philosophers) have turned their attention to what in 
more civil climes is referred to as the law of obligations.1 The result is 
a lively debate between the partisans of competing noneconomic theo-
ries of tort and contract. Central to these discussions is the disagree-
ment between corrective justice theorists, who see private law as a 
means of enforcing a wrongdoer’s duty to compensate the person that 
 *  Associate Professor, William & Mary Law School. This Article grew out of a series 
of exchanges with Curtis Bridgeman, John Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky, for which I 
am grateful. Neal Devins, Andrew Gold, and Stephen A. Smith provided extensive and helpful 
comments. All errors, of course, remain my sole responsibility. As always I thank Heather. 
 1.  Rather than defend my use of the term private law or the coherence of talking 
about private law as a unique field, for purposes of this Article I am using the term to refer 
to torts and contracts. The civil law of obligations also includes what we would call the law 
of unjust enrichment or quasi-contract. In this Article I do not purport to be opining on the 
theorization of unjust enrichment. 
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he has wronged, and civil recourse theorists, who see private law as 
empowering plaintiffs to act against those that have wronged them. 
 To those unfortunate enough not to work in the philosophy of pri-
vate law, the distinction between these two approaches may seem too 
fine to matter. A philosopher, of course, could respond that increasing 
our understanding, finding a theory that cuts closer to the joints of 
reality, provides its own justification. Others, however, might re-
spond that simply discovering an elegant theory of law is not ulti-
mately aesthetically important enough to justify itself. “Theories of 
law,” Michael Moore has observed, “are pretty poor art.”2 There are, 
however, at least two reasons to suppose that this debate matters. 
 First, both corrective justice and civil recourse theories are offered 
as interpretations of our law as it currently exists or, at any rate, 
normative reconstructions that plausibly identify core normative con-
cerns of the private law. Virtually any plausible theory of adjudica-
tion starts with the premise that like cases should be treated alike 
and that judges should decide new cases in accord with preexisting 
law. Even those who assert that judges do and should feel free to de-
cide cases on the basis of open-ended policy considerations rather 
than past precedent argue that such open-ended policy considera-
tions require that the law remain stable and minimally coherent.3
Hence, both traditional and pragmatic models of judging require that 
judges decide at least some cases in accordance with the law’s inter-
nal norms. Accordingly, it behooves us to discover the content and 
structure of those norms. 
 Second, interpretive theories are an important element in norma-
tive debates over law reform. For example, in the law of torts, the 
status of punitive damages is currently controversial in the United 
States. Numerous states have enacted tort reform statutes. The de-
bate pits two powerful constituencies—plaintiffs’ attorneys and busi-
nesses—against one another. Adjudicating the debate between cor-
rective justice theorists and civil recourse theorists cannot lay these 
controversies to rest, but it is relevant to how one views the issues. 
Punitive damages present an embarrassment for corrective justice 
theories, because punitive damages are by definition noncompensato-
ry. On the other hand, civil recourse theorists view the private law as 
empowering plaintiffs to act against defendants rather than as vindi-
cating a right to compensation per se. Accordingly, most civil re-
course theorists have argued that their approach provides justifica-
 2.  Michael Moore, Theories of Areas of Law, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 731, 733 (2000).  
 3.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 124-57 (1990) (argu-
ing that even open-ended, pragmatic adjudication requires an appreciation for the value of 
continuity in the law). 
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tion for punitive damages.4 Of course, regardless of which theory one 
takes as the best interpretation of the private law, one may believe 
that there are compelling independent reasons for limiting punitive 
damages. Nevertheless, for a corrective justice theorist, such limita-
tions will be seen as less violent to preexisting law and can even be 
seen as an extension of its inner logic by limiting anomalous ele-
ments from the law. For a civil recourse theorist, in contrast, limiting 
such damages marks the abandonment of a key normative element in 
our current law. 
 This Article contributes to this debate by defending a simple but 
counterintuitive claim: There is no duty to pay damages in either tort 
or contract law. The absence of such a duty provides a reason for be-
lieving that civil recourse provides a better account of private law 
than does corrective justice. Corrective justice is committed to inter-
preting the private law as creating duties for wrongdoers to compen-
sate their victims. In contrast, civil recourse sees the law as empow-
ering plaintiffs against defendants. My argument is that a careful 
analysis of the doctrines surrounding pleading, payment of damages, 
accord and satisfaction, and judgments reveals that our law gives 
plaintiffs the power to extract wealth from defendants but does not 
impose duties on defendants to compensate those that they have 
wronged. The structure of my argument is borrowed from a much 
older exchange between Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who thought 
that contract law imposed a duty to perform or pay damages, and 
Frederick Pollock, who denied that that the payment of damages was 
part of the duty to keep a contract.5 Pollock sought to demonstrate 
the absence of the duty to pay damages through an analysis of the 
doctrinal structure of contract law, particularly its pleading require-
ments. I side with Pollock against Holmes and think that the Eng-
lishman’s approach provides a useful model in the debate between 
corrective justice and civil recourse. 
 The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides 
a background to the debate between the corrective justice and civil 
recourse theories. Part III revisits the Holmes-Pollock debate over 
the nature of contractual liability. Part IV seeks to apply Pollock’s 
argument to current law and argues that there is no duty to pay 
 4.  See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and 
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 604-05 (2005); Benjamin 
C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 749-52 (2003) (dis-
cussing punitive damages). It is also worth adding, however, that by uncoupling the meas-
ure of damages from compensation, civil recourse may also provide a justification for sub-
compensatory damages. See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Re-
course Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 557-60 (2011) (arguing that 
civil recourse theory explains the pervasive use of subcompensatory damages in contract).  
 5.  See infra Part III.   
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damages. Part V anticipates and responds to some of the objections 
that could be made against my argument. Part VI concludes.  
II. FROM CORRECTIVE JUSTICE TO CIVIL RECOURSE
 Civil recourse theory has arisen out of a quarrel between economic 
and individual rights theorists of private law, mainly torts. According 
to law and economics scholars such as Richard Posner, Guido Calabresi, 
and Richard Epstein, the law of torts serves the goal of economic effi-
ciency by forcing agents to internalize the costs of their actions and 
thereby incentivizes them to make optimal levels of investment in 
precaution.6 On this view, damages in a tort suit are merely a fine, a 
kind of Pigouvian tax placed on externality-creating behavior.7
 Critics such as Jules Coleman and Ernest Weinrib offer a different 
vision of damages.8 A tort suit, these critics argue, always has a bi-
lateral structure.9 The plaintiff and defendant are connected to one 
another through the institution of liability. To put the point in more 
concrete terms, the primary remedy in tort consists of monetary 
damages, and those damages are always paid from losing defendants 
to victorious plaintiffs. This payment always occurs because the de-
fendant has committed a legal wrong and the plaintiff was the victim 
of that wrong. Yet, if tort law is simply a set of fines to incentivize the 
defendant, then this structure makes little sense. Why should the 
fine be paid to the plaintiff? Once the money is extracted from the 
defendant, the incentive effect is fully realized, even if the extracted 
money were given to the government or—similarly—thrown down a 
rat hole and burned. Giving the money to the plaintiff provides no 
incentive to the defendant, and by providing —admittedly sporadic 
and ad hoc—accident insurance to victims, damages create a moral 
hazard problem, making them economically perverse. Likewise, why 
 6.  See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 213-71 (8th ed. 2011); 
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 
(1961); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). 
 7.  See Alan J. Meese, The Externality of Victim Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201, 1221-
23 (2001) (discussing tort law and Pigouvian taxes).  
 8.  See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992) [hereinafter COLE-
MAN, RISKS AND WRONGS] (analyzing liability, risk and damages in tort law); JULES L.
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO 
LEGAL THEORY 13-24 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE] (discuss-
ing bilateralism); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) (discussing correc-
tive justice and correlativity); Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 
1233 (1988) (book review) (comparing the deterrence argument with the private enforce-
ment argument); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992) (argu-
ing that Aristotle’s formalism enables us to appreciate the distinctive coherence of private 
law relationships).  
 9.  See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 8, at 374-75 (discussing bilateral-
ism); WEINRIB, supra note 8, at 114-26 (same). Weinrib prefers the term correlativity ra-
ther than bilateralism. 
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not sue the person who could prevent the loss at the cheapest cost? 
For example, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs in a wrongful death 
suit over a company’s failure to install some multi-million dollar 
piece of safety equipment may not sue the bystander who walked in-
differently by the bleeding victim, even though the bystander could 
have saved the victim with a simple and all but costless tourniquet. 
In this situation, however, the bystander is clearly a cheaper cost 
avoider than the company. 
 Given such objections, Coleman and Weinrib argue that economics 
cannot explain the bilateral structure of a tort suit, but the much 
older idea of corrective justice can.10 According to Aristotle, the earli-
est theorist of corrective justice, “that which is just in private trans-
actions is indeed fair or equal in some sort, and that which is unjust 
is unfair or unequal; but the proportion to be observed here is not a 
geometrical proportion . . . but an arithmetical one.”11 This justice of 
private transactions—corrective justice—is arithmetical because it is 
a matter of subtraction and addition.12 In the case of a tort suit, it is 
the subtraction from the defendant and the addition to the plaintiff. 
The purpose is not to provide proper incentives but rather to vindi-
cate the duty owed—in justice—by wrongdoers to make their victims 
whole. The approach is ex post rather than ex ante in its orientation, 
seeking to correct past wrongs rather than create incentives for fu-
ture behavior.13 It thus rejects the normative orientation of econom-
 10.  See generally Coleman, supra note 8, at 1248-53 (differentiating the tort theory of 
recovery from a corrective justice standpoint and an economic standpoint); Weinrib, supra
note 8, at 403-21.  
 11.  ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 148 (F.H. Peters trans., 14th 
ed., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. n.d.) (1881), available at http://www.archive.org/stream/ 
nicomacheanethic1893aris#page/n5/mode/2up.   
 12.  Distributive justice constitutes the geometric principle of justice as it divvies up 
the good things of life on the basis of some morally relevant characteristic of the recipient. 
Distributive justice is thus a kind of ratio—hence the reference to geometry—between the 
goods distributed and the amount of the morally relevant characteristic possessed. Differ-
ent conceptions of distributive justice, of course, differ as to the morally relevant character-
istic, even if they have the same geometrical structure. Corrective justice, in contrast, is 
indifferent to moral characteristics of different people, but simply seeks to correct transac-
tional wrongs by arithmetically subtracting from a wrongdoer to compensate her victim. 
See id. (“For it makes no difference whether a good man defrauds a bad one, or a bad man a 
good one, nor whether a man who commits an adultery be a good or a bad man; the law 
looks only to the difference created by the injury, treating the parties themselves as equal, 
and only asking whether the one has done, and the other suffered, injury or damage.”). 
 13.  Compare COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 8, at 13-24, COLE-
MAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 8, Jules Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the 
Duty to Compensate, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451 (1987), Coleman, supra note 8, at 1240-53, 
Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427 (1992), 
and Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15 (1995), with
WEINRIB, supra note 8, Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 407, 429-50 (1987), Weinrib, supra note 8, Ernest J. Weinrib, Non-Relational Rela-
tionships: A Note on Coleman’s New Theory, 77 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1992), and Ernest J. 
Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107 (2001). 
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ics, which looks at future incentives rather than the compensation for 
past wrongs.  
 Civil recourse theorists consist mainly of heretics from within the 
corrective justice camp.14 They share a skepticism toward economic 
interpretations of tort law and believe that tort theory must be held 
accountable for the basic structural features of tort liability.15 Their 
critique of corrective justice theory thus has a similar structure to the 
corrective justice critique of economic accounts of tort law. In their 
view, corrective justice has failed to account for a key aspect of liabil-
ity, namely, the fact that tort law empowers plaintiffs to act against 
defendants.16 Tort law, they argue, does not enforce a duty of correc-
tive justice.17 Rather, it empowers the plaintiff to seek recourse 
against the tortfeasor in the courts.18
 Corrective justice, they argue, cannot account for this power-
conferring aspect of tort law.19 Corrective justice correctly notes the 
way in which tort liability connects tortfeasors and victims as plain-
tiffs and defendants.20 What civil recourse theorists deny is that this 
bipolar connection is defined primarily or exclusively in terms of the 
tortfeasor’s duty to make the victim whole.21 Rather, the bipolar rela-
tionship is defined by the way the law gives a wronged plaintiff pow-
er over his wrongdoer.22 In this sense, tort litigation is similar to—
but not identical to—the blood feuds that form the Teutonic preexist-
ence of the common law.  
 14.  See Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts: A Reply to Pro-
fessors Goldberg and Zipursky, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1023, 1023-27 (2005) (discussing 
the relationship between civil recourse theorists and other individual rights theorists of 
tort law). 
 15.  See generally Goldberg, supra note 4 at 583-627; Zipursky, supra note 4; Benjamin 
C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998) 
(criticizing and offering a substitute theory of corrective justice); Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 623 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 16.  See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 4, at 699 (“The state does not impose liability on its 
own initiative. It does so in response to a plaintiff’s suit demanding that the defendant be 
so required.”).  
 17.  See id. at 709-32 (critiquing corrective justice theory); Goldberg, supra note 4, at 
601-05 (analyzing the goals of tort law).  
 18.  See Goldberg, supra note 4, at 601 (“Tort law is a law for the redress of private 
wrongs because it empowers victims in particular ways.”). 
 19.  See Zipursky, supra note 4, at 709-10 (noting the difficulty of the corrective 
justice theory).   
 20.  See Goldberg, supra note 4, at 601-05 (discussing the connection between tort-
feasors and victims).  
 21.  See Zipursky, supra note 4, at 710 (“I argue that tort law frequently imposes rem-
edies that, in the circumstances, are not aimed at having the defendant make the plaintiff 
whole, so the recognition of a right in tort cannot be isomorphic with the recognition of a 
duty of repair.”).  
 22.  Id. at 734 (“When the state has recognized a right of action, and when a plaintiff 
has proven it, the state both permits and empowers a plaintiff to act against a defendant.”).  
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 While civil recourse theory smacks of vengeance, there are at least 
two important differences. First, and perhaps most importantly, the 
power that plaintiffs acquire over tortfeasors is extremely limited. 
They may not exact bloody retribution. Modern tort law dispenses 
with the lex talionis, and the most that a tort victim may hope for 
is the extraction of wealth from the tortfeasor. This is the civil in 
civil recourse.23
 Second, civil recourse theorists insist that they are not defending 
mere vengeance, but rather showing how tort law vindicates the de-
mands of justice. Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg, the two 
most prominent civil recourse theorists, for example, have sought to 
justify empowering plaintiffs on the basis of their reading of the 
Lockean social contract tradition.24 Locke posits that in the state of 
nature every person has the right to enforce the law of nature against 
those that violate it.25 The authority of the state to punish violations 
of the law of nature arises from the delegation of this power.26 The 
delegation, according to Locke, is not absolute. Each person retains 
the natural right to act against those that personally wrong him.27
The state’s suppression of violence, however, would leave people 
without the means of exercising this right unless it also provided a 
means of civil recourse.28 Alternatively, Jason Solomon has offered an 
elaborate defense of civil recourse based on the “second-person 
standpoint” articulated in moral philosophy by Stephen Darwall.29
According to Solomon, tort law governs situations in which one is 
both entitled to feel aggrieved and entitled to act on the basis of that 
 23.  Id. at 750 (“Of course, it is crucial to our civil system that . . . physical violence is 
not permitted: monetary damages through civil litigation is the remedy.”). 
 24.  Id. at 735 (discussing Locke); Goldberg, supra note 4, at 541-44 (same). 
 25.  Locke wrote as follows: 
[T]hat all men may be restrained from invading others Rights, and from doing 
hurt to one another, and the Law of Nature be observed, which willeth the 
Peace and Preservation of all Mankind, the Execution of the Law of Nature is in 
that State [i.e., the state of nature] put into every Mans hands, whereby every 
one has a right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as 
may hinder its Violation. 
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2d ed. 1970) (1690). 
 26.  See id. at 342 (“And thus the Commonwealth comes by a Power to set down, what 
punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, com-
mitted amongst the Members of that Society, (which is the power of making Laws) as well 
as it has the power to punish any Injury done unto any of its Members, by any one that is 
not of it, (which is the power of War and Peace[]) and all this for the preservation of the 
property of all the Members of that Society, as far as is possible.”).  
27.  Id. at 273 (stating that man “has besides the right of punishment common to him 
with other Men, a particular Right to seek Reparation from him that has done it”). 
  28.  Id. at 292 (describing the right to reparation for damage done and noting that one 
“cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private Man; for the damage he has received”).  
 29.  See Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 1765, 1791-94 (2009). 
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feeling.30 Hence, recourse is not about vengeance but the vindication 
of moral rights.31
 The disagreement between corrective justice and civil recourse 
theories presents at least two different debates. First, there is the nor-
mative debate about whether the substantive values embodied in each 
theory are morally attractive. Second, there is an interpretive debate 
about which theory best accounts for our current legal institutions. 
The remainder of this Article is concerned with this second question.  
 H.L.A. Hart provided a distinction that gives us one way of under-
standing the differing claims that each theory makes about the struc-
ture of private law. Much of Hart’s philosophy was articulated in re-
sponse to the work of John Austin, which sought to reduce the entire 
concept of law to the idea of commands issued by a sovereign and 
backed by threats.32 Hart’s most famous response was to point out 
that from the “internal point of view,” law consisted of more than 
simply a threat; it also purported to offer a reason for acting one way 
or another.33 Hart’s second and less-celebrated response to Austin 
was to point out that the law does more than simply create duties.34
It also empowers people. The rule that a will requires two witnesses 
or that an administrative agency may promulgate regulations does 
not consist of commands to do one thing or the other.35 Rather, such 
rules give testators and regulators certain powers that they may then 
use or not use as they see fit.36
 Corrective justice theories can be understood as positing a duty on 
the part of tortfeasors and contract breakers to pay damages to those 
that they harm. Civil recourse theories, in contrast, deny that there 
is a duty to pay damages. Rather, a tort or a breach of contract cre-
ates a power in the plaintiff, the power of acting against the defend-
ant and extracting from him or her whatever wealth or other recom-
pense the law will allow. The theories thus see lawsuits in very dif-
ferent terms. For a corrective justice theorist, when a plaintiff sues a 
defendant, the plaintiff is asking the law to force the defendant to 
fulfill a duty—the duty to pay compensation—that the defendant has 
failed to carry out. For a civil recourse theorist, in contrast, there is 
no such duty. Rather a tort or breach of contract makes the defend-
 30.  See id. at 1784-97 (discussing the moral foundations of recourse theory). 
 31.  See id. at 1810 (“One might say, then, that tort law supports a particular moral 
order of equal accountability.”). 
 32.  Compare JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 9-33 (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., 1954) (1832) (setting 
forth Austin’s command theory of law), with H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18-81 (2d 
ed. 1994) (criticizing Austin’s theory).  
 33.  See HART, supra note 32, at 91-94 (discussing the internal point of view). 
 34.  See id. at 27-29. 
 35.  See id.
 36.  See id.
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ant vulnerable to the plaintiff’s newly acquired power to proceed 
against the defendant. There is not, however, a duty on the defend-
ant’s part to pay damages. Whether the defendant will be forced to 
relinquish property depends entirely on the plaintiff’s decision to use 
his power. 
 The dichotomy between duty and power provides us with a man-
ageable way of posing at least part of the question as to which theory 
provides a better interpretation of current law. When a tortfeasor 
commits a tort or a promisor breaches a contract, is there a duty to 
pay damages? 
III.   HOLMES AND POLLOCK ON THE DUTY TO PAY DAMAGES
 By a happy coincidence this question was the subject of debate 
nearly a century ago between two of the common law’s greatest early 
contract theorists: Oliver Wendell Holmes and Frederick Pollock. The 
exchange arose out of Holmes’s option theory of contract. He first 
seems to have groped toward this argument during a series of lec-
tures at Harvard Law School in 1872. His original target was John 
Austin, who insisted that legal duties consisted of nothing more than 
commands of the sovereign backed by legal threats. Holmes was un-
persuaded. Austin’s theory, he in effect argued, implausibly reduced 
civil liability to a sanction attached to a sovereign command. But, 
Holmes insisted, “[t]he notion of duty involves something more than 
a tax on a certain course of conduct.”37 He continued that “an abso-
lute command does not exist—penalty or no penalty—unless a breach 
of it is deprived of the protection of the law, which is shown by a 
number of consequences not accurately determinable in a general 
definition, such as the invalidity of contracts to do the forbidden 
act.”38 A decade later, he sharpened his argument, writing in The 
Common Law:
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, 
that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised 
event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from 
interference until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and there-
fore free to break his contract if he chooses.39
Knowingly or unknowingly, Holmes was echoing the earlier thought 
of Austin’s patron Jeremy Bentham, who wrote that “[a] fixed penalty 
is a license in disguise.”40
 37.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 6 AM. L. REV. 723, 724 (1872).  
 38.  Id. at 724-25. This book notice, written by Holmes, is generally accepted as being 
based on his Harvard lectures, of which no copy survives. See generally 2 MARK DEWOLFE 
HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882, at 76-77 (1963). 
 39.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 301 (1923) (1881). 
 40.  JEREMY BENTHAM, Last Epigrams and Sayings, in A BENTHAM READER 359, 363 
(Mary Peter Mack ed., 1969). 
146 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:137
 Pollock disagreed. Between 1874 and 1932 the two men carried on 
a voluminous correspondence.41 Tellingly, in 1874 Pollock sent the 
first letter of the exchange in response to the American Law Review
article in which Holmes first began to articulate his option theory. 
“As to duty in cases of contract,” Pollock wrote, “I think the enforce-
ment when practicable of specific performances clearly distinguishes 
the ‘sanction’ from what you call a tax on a course of conduct.”42 The 
disagreement between the two men on the nature of contractual lia-
bility would continue for more than fifty years. 
 In 1928, Pollock put his objections in another series of letters, this 
time using the language of common law pleading, which he had im-
mersed himself in as a legal historian. “[H]ow [do] you escape censur-
ing the common form of declaration in assumpsit[?]” he challenged 
Holmes.43 “Don’t you want an averment of neither performance nor
tender of damages[?]”44 Holmes responded by insisting that Pollock 
was arguing against a straw man. He wrote: 
With regard to contracts I will bore you no more except to say that 
your suggestion that I ought to criticize the declaration in assump-
sit for not denying tender of damages, shows the persistence of the 
impression that I say that a man promises either X or to pay dam-
ages. I don’t think a man promises to pay damages in contract any 
more than in tort. He commits an act that makes him liable for 
them if a certain event does not come to pass, just as his act in tort 
makes him liable simpliciter.45
Pollock, however, was not quite ready to concede the point and fired 
off his reply two weeks later. “I don’t see the way to any neat con-
trast-parallel between contract [and] tort liability.”46 He continued: 
There is no act I have committed beyond being born to make me li-
able for my own trespasses when I trespass: whereas I am not in a 
position to be liable for my cattle trespassing unless I choose to 
keep cattle, which in fact I don’t. But the language and pleading of 
our law make no distinction until it comes to assuming a position 
which makes me answerable to some certain person or sort of per-
sons e.g. invitees in my place of business—the original super se as-
sumpsit inducing a declaration in Tort is typical of this.47
 For a reader living in the world of notice pleading, understanding 
Pollock’s argument can be difficult. He initially understood Holmes 
 41.  See generally 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961); 
2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961).    
 42.  1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 41, at 3. 
 43.  2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 41, at 233. 
 44.  Id.
 45.  Id.
 46.  Id. at 234. 
 47.  Id. at 234-35. 
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as claiming that contractual liability consisted of a disjunctive prom-
ise to perform or to pay damages.48 Pollock in effect conceded that 
there was a duty to perform a contract, but he questioned whether 
the payment of damages constituted a form of contractual perfor-
mance.49 Put another way, he denied that there was a contractual 
duty to pay damages. This did not mean, of course, that he thought it 
was impossible to force a defendant to pay a plaintiff damages, only 
that the payment of such damages was not a duty arising out of the 
contract itself. In support of his claim, he looked to the pleading re-
quirements for the action of assumpsit, the common law writ tradi-
tionally used for the enforcement of contracts not under seal. Under 
the writ system, the rules of pleading were exacting.50 The failure to 
plead every element of the legal wrong would result in the dismissal 
of the plaintiff’s suit upon demurrer by the defendant.51 In an action 
of assumpsit, it was necessary to plead that the defendant had un-
dertaken to do some action and had failed to perform as promised.52
It was not necessary, however, to plead that upon failing to perform 
the defendant had also failed to pay damages. Yet, if payment of such 
damages was a way in which the promisor’s duty could be fully dis-
charged, Pollock argued, surely the plaintiff would be required to 
plead the failure to tender damages.53 Accordingly, Pollock concluded 
that there was no duty to pay damages in the case of nonperfor-
mance.54 Rather, there was simply a duty to perform, as this was the 
only duty whose failure needed to be proven at trial. 
 Holmes’s response was to insist that he didn’t regard the duty to 
pay damages as arising from the contract itself.55 It was not that the 
promisor promised to perform or pay damages. Rather, he thought 
that the law simply imposed the duty to pay damages regardless of 
what the parties intended.56 Pollock’s reply again fell back on the log-
ic of the writ system. According to Holmes’s clarification, as Pollock 
understood it, the contract is not the source of the duties.57 Rather, it 
 48.  See id. at 234 (“I did suppose, not alone it seems, that you[, Holmes,] conceived a 
contractual promise as being in ultimate analysis for performance or damages . . . .”). 
 49.  See id. at 233. 
 50.  See RICHARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 279-81 (2006) (dis-
cussing the common law pleading system).  
 51.  See id. at 280 (“Moreover, the writs were extremely narrow, and it was easy for a 
plaintiff to establish at trial a right to recovery that was different from the writ she had 
chosen. The price to pay for this ‘variance’ was steep—the plaintiff lost.”).  
 52.  See generally J.B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1888) 
(providing a historical survey of assumpsit).  
 53.  See 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 41, at 233.  
 54.  Id.
 55.  See id. (“I don’t think a man promises to pay damages in contract nay more than 
in tort.”).  
 56.  See id. (“He commits an act that makes him liable for them if a certain event does 
not come to pass, just as his act in tort makes him liable simpliciter.”). 
 57.  Id. at 234-35.  
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is merely a fact about the world that gives rise to a duty to pay if the 
promisor happens to fail to do certain things. In torts, Pollock argued, 
certain actions—trespass to land, for example—give rise to liability 
without any other fact other than the brute existence of the tortfea-
sor on the victim’s property.58 Other torts—trespass by cattle, for ex-
ample—require a prior undertaking by the tortfeasor—the ownership 
of cattle in Pollock’s example.59 Yet, in a tort action, this prior under-
taking by the tortfeasor need not be pleaded. In contrast, in an action 
of assumpsit the prior undertaking—the contract—by the promisor 
must be plead. If the contract was simply a fact about the world that 
happened to be a predicate to liability rather than a fount of obliga-
tion, Pollock argued in effect, then why does the action of assumpsit 
require the plaintiff to plead the existence of the contract but an ac-
tion of trespass by cattle does not require the plaintiff to plead the 
tortfeasor’s choice to keep cattle?60 The correspondence does not rec-
ord an answer from Holmes. 
 The Holmes-Pollock exchange is instructive for two reasons. First, 
while Pollock is not arguing about the merits of civil recourse or cor-
rective justice, it is striking that he concluded that there was not a 
duty to pay damages in lieu of performance.61 Second, and more im-
portantly, his careful attention to the writ system forces the question 
of a duty to pay damages down to a very concrete inquiry into wheth-
er there is evidence that the law regards the tender of damages upon 
breach of an obligation—or the absence of such tender —as an ele-
ment of any cognizable legal wrong. Pollock’s method provides a use-
ful model for approaching the debate between corrective justice and 
civil recourse theories. While we are a century or more removed from 
the formalities of the writ system on which he relied, his basic ap-
proach can be applied to current law. We can look to the ways in 
which the law recognizes the elements of a duty in its pleading re-
quirements or elsewhere in the rules surrounding a particular act 
such as the tender of money after a tort or breach of contract.  
IV.   TENDER OF DAMAGES AND CURRENT LAW
 Just as Pollock looked carefully to procedural and remedial law to 
test whether Holmes’s description of contract matched the structure 
of common law liability, a careful examination of the same bodies of 
law reveals that failing to pay damages does not breach a legal duty. 
Upon the commission of a tort or the breach of a contract, there is no 
duty to tender damages. Certainly, the absence of such tender is not 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See id. (“[W]hereas I am not in a position to be liable for my cattle trespassing 
unless I choose to keep cattle, which in fact I don’t.”).  
 61.  Id. at 233.  
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an element of any cause of action, and the tender of damages is not a 
defense. This, in turn, suggests that corrective justice theorists are 
mistaken when they posit that tortfeasors and contract breachers 
have a duty to make their victims whole. As a matter of law, no such 
duty exists. Indeed, even after a plaintiff has successfully obtained a 
judgment against a defendant, with the exception of a few special cir-
cumstances, there is no duty to tender damages. A defendant may 
simply ignore the judgment without committing any additional legal 
wrong. These claims can be supported by looking closely at the doc-
trines surrounding settlement, accord and satisfaction, and the levy-
ing of judgments. 
 As Pollock noted, in order to establish a cause of action for breach 
of contract or in tort, it is not necessary to allege the failure to pay 
damages.62 Pleading standards today are much more liberal than 
they were under the writ system.63 This does not mean, however, that 
Pollock’s argument is without force today. Even under these relaxed 
standards, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”64 Further-
more, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 
defendant to file a demurrer to any complaint for “failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.”65 “To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”66 We 
thus have a body of law devoted to analyzing the elements of the du-
ties that must be breached to give rise to a cause of action in tort or 
contract. It is difficult to prove a negative, but there does not seem to 
be any case in which a complaint asking for relief in a tort case or a 
contract case has been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to 
allege that the defendant failed to tender damages. On the other 
hand, a contract case will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing 
to allege the existence of a contract or its breach by the defendant.67
Likewise, a tort suit may not survive a motion to dismiss if it fails to 
allege negligent or otherwise tortious behavior by the defendant, but 
failing to allege tender of damages is likely to be harmless to the 
 62.  See id. at 235.  
 63.  See FREER, supra note 50, at 278 (“[P]leading practice today is more forgiving than 
it was in earlier eras.”).  
 64.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 65.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 66.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
 67.  See Grisby v. Wilberforce Univ., No. 3:05-cv-014, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49062, at 
*19 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (dismissing breach of contract claim because the plaintiff failed to 
allege breach).  
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plaintiff’s cause.68 Yet, if the tender of damages were a duty that 
arose upon breach of contract or commission of a tort, then it seems 
that one ought to plead its failure in order to state a claim for relief. 
 Our current law, however, goes beyond merely not requiring that 
one plead tender of damages. In most cases, evidence of pretrial 
payment of damages by the defendant is not even admissible. Federal 
Rule of Evidence 409 codifies the old common law rule on this point, 
prohibiting the introduction of “[e]vidence of furnishing or offering or 
promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by 
an injury.”69 The rule, however, only precludes the admission of the 
evidence to prove liability.70 For example, if the location where an 
injury occurred is in dispute, a defendant’s tender of medical expens-
es might be admissible if the circumstances surrounding the tender 
provided factual evidence as to where the injury occurred.71 Pointed-
ly, in this case, the evidence is admissible precisely because the fact 
of tender itself is not an element of the plaintiff’s case for liability.72
 This rule is generally defended on humanitarian grounds.73 Often 
people will offer help to those in distress not because they are admit-
ting fault but simply as an act of compassion.74 Such behavior should 
be encouraged, and keeping it from being used against the Good Sa-
maritan later in court seems wise.75 Such a justification for the rule 
could be consistent with a duty to pay damages, and the rule itself 
 68.  See Aaronson v. Vital Pharms., Inc., No. 09-cv-1333 W(CAB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEX-
IS 14160, at *17 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (refusing to dismiss complaint for failure to specify 
amount of damages). 
 69.  FED. R. EVID. 409; see also Flieg v. Levy, 133 N.Y.S. 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912) 
(applying the common law rule); Brown v. Wood, 160 S.E. 281, 283 (N.C. 1931) (same); 2 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:62 (3d ed. 
2007) (discussing the relationship between the common law rule and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence). 
 70.  FED. R. EVID. 409 (noting that such evidence is only “not admissible to prove liabil-
ity for the injury”).  
 71.  See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Custin, 13 N.E.2d 542, 545-46 (Ind. 1938) (“The 
court overruled the objection and permitted the appellee to answer, that the manager said 
to her that she must have it (the injury) taken care of right away and send the bill to him. 
There is a dispute between the appellant and appellee as to whether appellee was injured 
at all in appellant’s store.”). 
 72.  See id. at 546 (“The evident purpose of this testimony was to support appellee in 
her contention that the injury was caused as she had described.”). 
 73.  See Galarnyk v. Hostmark Mgmt., 55 Fed. App’x 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2003); Olden-
burg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 314 P.2d 33, 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Grogan v. Dooley, 105 
N.E. 135, 136 (N.Y. 1914).
 74.  See Grogan, 105 N.E. at 136 (“In the case at hand the defendants made a sponta-
neous offer of assistance, and are now told that, in doing so, they made evidence against 
themselves. The law would be doing wrong to employers and scant service to em-
ploy[ees] if it throttled the impulses of benevolence by distorting humane conduct into a 
confession of wrongdoing.”).  
 75.  See Oldenburg, 314 P.2d at 41 (“Logic and reason support this view. If a contrary 
rule were adopted, it would tend to deter, instead of encourage, one who has injured anoth-
er from giving aid.”).  
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would still allow a defendant to introduce evidence that he or she 
tendered payment to the plaintiff as a defense. It is striking, howev-
er, that none of the judicial elaborations of the rule ever discuss how 
the exclusion of this evidence bears on meeting the burden of proving 
some duty to pay damages.76 Furthermore, while payments of medi-
cal expenses may be used to offset any final damage award, the mere 
fact of tendering damages is not a defense to liability. For example, in 
some jurisdictions any money already tendered by the defendant to 
the plaintiff at the time of the suit need not be raised at the answer 
stage in the pleadings where affirmative defenses are normally 
raised.77 Rather, the fact of payment may be raised later when calcu-
lating damages, suggesting that tender is irrelevant to the question 
of liability.78 This issue has not been explicitly addressed under the 
Federal Rules.79
 Likewise, there is not a duty to tender damages for breach of con-
tract. Of course, one can tender payment for an unliquidated or dis-
puted debt under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.80 If the ten-
der is accepted, accord and satisfaction is then a defense against the 
original contractual liability.81 An accord and satisfaction, however, 
constitutes a new contract in place of the old contract, rather than 
the performance of a duty associated with breach.82 To be sure, in the 
classic case where a debtor tenders a check with “payment in full” 
scribbled someplace on it, the tenderee’s consent may become some-
what attenuated.83 Even the most formalistic jurisdictions, however, 
require the tender to be accepted to extinguish liability on the origi-
 76.  Again, it is difficult to prove a negative. I have not seen any cases in which this 
has happened. 
 77.  See, e.g., Edwards v. Passarelli Bros. Aut. Serv., Inc., 221 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Ohio 
1966) (allowing an insurance company to obtain an offset via post-trial motion in the face of 
the plaintiff’s argument that the failure to raise the issue earlier rendered it res judicata). 
 78.  See, e.g., Walsh v. Boston Sand & Gravel Co., 175 F. Supp. 411, 414 (D. Mass. 
1959) (crediting amounts previously paid by defendant to injured seaman in order “to avoid 
double payment”); Spielman v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 147 F. Supp. 451, 
453 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) (railroad’s payments of medical expenses would be deducted from 
amount of judgment thereafter awarded); Lundy v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 96 F. Supp. 19, 22 
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (advance payments by defendant shipowner would be deducted from libel-
lant’s damages).  
 79.  See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 69, § 4:62, at 175 (“There is state 
precedent, sometimes generated in the context of a specific statutory scheme, that utilizes 
a post-trial motion procedure to reduce the judgment by the amount of the advances.”); 23 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 409 
(3d ed. 1998).   
 80.  See 13 SARAH HOWARD JENKINS, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: DISCHARGE § 70.1 (Jo-
seph M. Perillo ed., 2003) (describing the accord and satisfaction doctrine). 
 81.  Id.
 82.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281(1) (1981) (“An accord is a con-
tract under which an obligee promises to accept a stated performance in satisfaction of the 
obligor’s existing duty. Performance of the accord discharges the original duty.”). 
 83.  See, e.g., Deuches v. Grand Rapids Brass Co., 215 N.W. 392, 393 (Mich. 1927) (dis-
cussing such a situation).  
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nal contract.84 Tender alone, on the other hand, does not discharge 
any duty associated with the contract. For instruments governed by 
the Uniform Commercial Code, the requirements are more exacting. 
The tender must be made in good faith, and the offer of an accord 
must be conspicuous.85 In short, the one area where contract doctrine 
explicitly addresses the treatment of tender of what might be charac-
terized as damages after breach neither imposes a duty of tender nor 
allows the bare fact of tender to act as a defense. 
 The absence of a legal duty to pay damages, however, is most 
dramatically illustrated by the way in which judgments are treated. 
In a tort or contract action, a successful plaintiff will obtain a judg-
ment of liability against the defendant. The defendant, however, does 
not thereby acquire a duty to pay the judgment to the plaintiff. Ra-
ther the plaintiff is empowered to act against the defendant, taking 
his property to satisfy the judgment. As the leading American trea-
tise on the subject summarized it: 
Ordinary money judgments reflect an adjudication of liability but 
they do not enter any command to the defendant. Money judg-
ments rendered by the old separate law courts and most money 
judgments today are in a form which says that the plaintiff shall 
have and recover of the defendant the sum of $10. Since this was 
not a personal order, the defendant who does not pay was not 
jailed for contempt. Instead, enforcement is achieved indirectly by 
seizing the defendant’s property.86
Strikingly, the failure to pay an ordinary judgment is not a legal 
wrong. It does not give rise to any additional liability or other sanc-
tion.87 Indeed, it is not unheard of for plaintiffs to fail to collect on a 
 84.  See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Arroll, 322 N.Y.S.2d 420, 423 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1971) (“The company argues that the nature and volume of its operations does not 
allow for an examination by bank employees of each and every check it receives for lan-
guage written thereon which could bind it to an accord and satisfaction. . . . I cannot accept 
this conclusion.”). 
 85.  U.C.C. § 3-311 (2005) (requiring “conspicuous statement” on instrument tendered 
as satisfaction and “good faith” by the tenderer).  
 86.  1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 1.4,
at 14-15 (2d ed. 1993). 
 87.  Id. Something like this also seems to be the rule in English law. As one English 
textbook puts it, “If the judgment is for money, a sheriff or sheriff’s officer is directed to seize 
goods belonging to the defendant and, after selling them, to pay the plaintiff out of the 
proceeds.” F.H. LAWSON, REMEDIES OF ENGLISH LAW 8 (2d ed. 1980). Execution on the person 
as opposed to the property of the defendant has been sharply limited under English law: 
Imprisonment for debt was abolished by the Debtors Act [of] 1869, except 
where a debtor could but would not pay; and debts owed to the Crown were ex-
empted from the Act. By the Administration of Justice Act [of] 1970, which 
made general the power to attach earnings, imprisonment was further restrict-
ed so as to apply only to persons who default in the payment of maintenance 
and certain rates and taxes.
Id. at 9. Even in these cases, however, actual imprisonment is exceedingly rare.  
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judgment, either because the defendant has no nonexempt assets or 
because the plaintiff lacks the resources to locate the defendant’s as-
sets.88 While attempts to hide assets from creditors may give rise to 
additional remedies to the plaintiff under the law of fraudulent con-
veyances, the bare failure to pay the judgment does nothing.89
 Another way of approaching the issue is to contrast an ordinary 
judgment in a tort or contract case with debts where the law does 
impose an affirmative duty to pay. For example, child support obliga-
tions involve more than simply a power in the beneficiary to extract 
wealth from the obligor by levying against his or her property.90 Ra-
ther, the law imposes an affirmative duty to pay such debts.91 Failure 
to pay the debt can result in imprisonment for contempt of court.92
Indeed, in some jurisdictions failure to make child support payments 
is a crime that can be prosecuted by executive branch officers.93
Likewise, some jurisdictions create similar duties in cases of alimony 
or property settlements, punishing debtors who fail to pay such obli-
gations.94 Tax liability is another situation in which there is an af-
                                                                                                                  
When it occurs at the present day, civil imprisonment is almost always by way 
of committal for contempt of court. . . . Such imprisonment is rare except of 
husbands who deliberately fail to pay sums they have been ordered to pay by 
way of maintenance to their wives or have molested them in defiance of a 
court order.  
Id. Hence, under English law—like American law—the primary effect of an award of 
money damages is to empower the plaintiff to act against the defendant’s property via a 
writ of fieri facias or a writ garnishment. The defendant, however, is not ordered to pay 
except in exceptional circumstances. See id. at 8-9 (describing court methods for enforcing a 
monetary judgment). 
 88.  See, e.g., George Norris Stavis, Note, Collecting Judgments in Human Rights Torts 
Cases—Flexibility for Non-Profit Litigators?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 209 (1999) 
(noting the difficulty of collecting monetary judgments in human rights cases).  
 89.  See PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 1:12 (2006) (out-
lining commercial fraudulent disposition law).  
 90.  See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 187 N.E. 836, 837 (Ind. 1933) (“The order for imprison-
ment in this class of cases, therefore, is not to vindicate the authority of the law, but is 
remedial, and is intended to coerce the defendant to do the thing required by the order for 
the benefit of the complainant.”).  
 91.  See infra note 93. 
 92.  See T.C. Williams, Contempt Proceedings to Enforce Decree or Order in Divorce or 
Separation Suit for Support of Children, 172 A.L.R. 869 (1948) (listing cases involving con-
tempt proceedings to enforce an order for child support). Texas goes further, revoking li-
censes, including hunting licenses, of any person who fails to pay child support. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 232.003(a) (West 2008).  
 93.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-509(A) (2000) (“The attorney general or coun-
ty attorney may establish, modify or enforce such a duty of support by all means available, 
including all civil and criminal remedies provided by law.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 5245 (West 
2004) (“Nothing in this chapter limits the authority of the local child support agency to use 
any other civil and criminal remedies to enforce support obligations . . . .”); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 119A, § 2(a) (West 2008) (mandating agency enforcement of child support 
orders “through civil and criminal proceedings”).  
 94.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7(j) (2002) (authorizing civil contempt for non-
payment of alimony orders); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502(e)(6) (West 2001) (same). 
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firmative duty to pay a debt, a duty that will result in a sanction for 
failing to carry it out.95 Other examples exist.96
 In fairness, Vermont has enacted a statute that allows a judgment 
creditor whose judgment has not been satisfied within thirty days to 
demand a financial disclosure hearing.97 “[T]he court after hearing 
may order the judgment debtor to make such payments as the court, 
in its discretion, deems appropriate. Failure to make such payments 
may be considered civil contempt of court.”98 This statute, however, 
may be the exception that proves the general rule that damage 
awards merely empower plaintiffs rather than create duties to pay on 
the part of defendants. First, the Vermont statute is plaintiff cen-
tered. Nothing will happen if the judgment creditor chooses not to 
exercise his or her rights.99 Furthermore, the judge’s ability to coerce 
payment from a judgment debtor has been restricted by applicable 
case law. In Hale v. Peddle, the Vermont Supreme Court overturned 
the contempt conviction of a judgment debtor who failed to pay in 
response to an order under the statute.100 The court found that 
“[a]lthough the court has discretionary power to punish a party for 
contempt, noncompliance with a court order by itself is an insuffi-
cient basis for exercising that power.”101 The Vermont Supreme Court 
went on to state that contempt is only appropriate in cases where the 
defendant deliberately flouted a court order that he was capable of 
complying with.102 “Contempt cannot be used as a mere debt-
collecting device.”103 Furthermore, no other state seems to have fol-
 95.  See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6651, 6653 (2006) (adding civil penalty for failure to file return 
and for nonpayment of tax); I.R.C. § 7203 (2006) (criminal penalty for nonpayment of tax). 
 96.  Bankruptcy courts can order debtors to turn over money for the benefit of credi-
tors, although this procedure is arguably more analogous to the law of fraudulent convey-
ances. See Jayne S. Ressler, Civil Contempt Confinement and the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: An Examination of Debtor Incarceration in 
the Modern Age, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 355, 363-67 (2006). Courts will also order disgorgement 
of unjustly retained benefits for the benefit of judgment creditors. See, e.g., Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Armstrong, 284 F.3d 404, 405-06 (2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing an 
appeal from a contempt order even though the contemnor had been imprisoned for over two 
years for failure to comply with a court order to turn over almost $15 million worth of cor-
porate assets); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 
950 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming contempt imprisonment for refusal to 
comply with a court order to disgorge profits from fraudulent sale of securities).  
 97.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §5537(a) (2002) (“On request of a judgment creditor[,] 
. . . the court shall order the judgment debtor to appear before it and to disclose infor-
mation relating to his or her ability to pay the judgment in full.”). 
 98.  Id. § 5537(b). 
 99.  See id. § 5537(a) (stating that initiation is “[o]n request of a judgment creditor”). 
 100.  648 A.2d 830 (Vt. 1993). 
 101.  Id. at 831. 
 102.  See id. (“[I]n order to hold a person in contempt, a court must find, based on evi-
dence, that defendant not only refused to pay but also that he has the ability to make the 
ordered payments.”). 
 103.  Id.
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lowed Vermont in making an injunctive remedy available to collect 
ordinary debts.104
 In summary, there does not seem to be a duty to pay damages for 
tort or breach of contract. The failure to tender such damages is not 
an element of the legal wrong for either tort or contract. At the very 
least, the failure to pay compensation need not be plead. In tort, not 
only is there no requirement to plead the failure to tender damages, 
in most cases evidence of any attempt to tender damages could be 
excluded. Likewise, in contract, tender of damages has an effect on 
liability only if the tender is an offer that is accepted, thereby form-
ing a new contract. Most strikingly, however, a judgment of liability 
generally does not create any legally recognized duty to pay damages. 
To be sure, it allows a plaintiff to forcibly take a defendant’s property 
if she wishes to do so, and the threat of execution is generally suffi-
cient to motivate solvent debtors to pay. This is not because of a fail-
ure of imagination on the law’s part. There are debts where there is a 
duty to pay, a duty whose violation will result in sanctions. This, 
however, is not true in tort and contract cases. Here, the law empow-
ers plaintiffs rather than imposing duties to compensate on defendants.  
V. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
 There are at least three objections that can be made to the argu-
ments in the preceding section. First, one could use the distinction 
between primary and secondary duties to reject the arguments. On 
this view, the apparent absence of a duty to pay damages arises from 
the fact that it is a secondary rather than a primary duty. Second, 
one could argue that too much is being made of a distinction that is 
essentially a historical accident. On this view, the apparent absence 
of a duty to pay damages results from the fact that the law of torts 
and contracts grew out of legal rather than equity procedure, and no 
importance should be attached to this fact. Third, one could argue 
that there actually is a duty to pay damages; it is simply a duty to 
which no legal sanction is attached. I articulate each of these objec-
tions and my responses below. 
 The first objection rests on the distinction between primary and 
secondary rights. According to John Austin, the law recognizes what 
he calls primary rights and duties and secondary rights and duties.105
 104.  New York does have a statute that allows for treble damages in cases of a judg-
ment debtor with three outstanding small claims judgments who does not satisfy the 
judgment within thirty days. See N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1812 (McKinney 2011). 
Even this statute, however, applies only to a fairly narrow class of judgment debtors. 
 105.  See generally 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 788-800 (Robert 
Campbell ed., 4th ed. 1873) (discussing the distinction between primary and secondary 
rights and duties). John Austin was a leading utilitarian thinker, and therein lies a certain 
irony in his formulation of primary and secondary rights. Blackstone was a much-abused 
figure by utilitarians. Bentham wrote of “the universal inaccuracy and confusion which 
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Primary rights and duties specify the conduct that the law requires 
of citizens. For example, one has a duty not to trespass on another’s 
land, and the owner of the land has a corresponding right to be free 
of such trespasses. “If the obedience to the law were absolutely per-
fect,” Austin writes, “primary rights and duties are the only ones 
which would exist; or, at least are the only ones which would ever be 
exercised, or which could ever assume a practical form.”106 However, 
such is not the case. Persons often defy the law and fail to live up to 
the primary duties that it imposes upon them. When this happens, 
the violation of primary rights and duties gives rise to secondary 
rights and duties.107
 This distinction has been made explicit by Lord Diplock in the 
English law of contracts.108 In Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor 
Transport Ltd.,109 he wrote that “a contract is the source of primary 
legal obligations on each party to it to procure that [w]hatever he has 
promised will be done is done.”110 He went on to explain: 
Every failure to perform a primary obligation is a breach of con-
tract. The secondary obligation on the part of the contract breaker 
to which it gives rise by implication of the common law is to pay 
                                                                                                                  
seemed to my apprehension to pervade the whole” of the work. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAG-
MENT ON GOVERNMENT 94 (F.C. Montague ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1891) (1776). The influ-
ence of Blackstone’s thinking on remedies on Bentham’s main jurisprudential heir, John 
Austin, is thus ironic. For Blackstone the private law was organized around a four-part 
structure of a right, wrong, action, and remedy. See Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Rem-
edies, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (discussing Blackstone’s typology and its rela-
tionship to Austin’s thought). At each stage in the process the law defined the scope of the 
concepts. Hence, one had a legal right to quiet enjoyment of property. See 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *208-09 (1768). A trespasser committed a wrong when he 
entered property without the owner’s consent. See id. at *209 (“Every unwarrantable entry 
on another’s soil the law entitles a trespass by breaking his close . . . .”). This gave rise to 
an action for trespass. See id. at *210 (describing the requirements of trespass). If success-
ful, the action then provided the property owner with a remedy such as money damages. 
Austin adopted Blackstone’s basic approach, but simplified it. See Birks, supra, at 4-6 (dis-
cussing Austin’s simpler version of Blackstone’s typology). 
 106.  AUSTIN, supra note 105, at 790. 
 107.  According to Austin: 
All the rights and duties which I style sanctioning or secondary, are undoubted-
ly means or instruments for making the primary available. They arise out of 
violations of primary rights, and are mainly intended to prevent such viola-
tions: though in the case of the rights and duties which arise out of civil inju-
ries, the secondary rights and duties also answer the subordinate purpose of 
giving redress to the injured parties. 
Id. at 789. 
 108.  See Brice Dickson, The Contribution of Lord Diplock to the General Law of Contract,
9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 441 (1989) (describing Lord Diplock’s application of primary and 
secondary rights to contracts). 
 109.   [1980] A.C. 827 (H.L.) (Diplock L.J.). 
 110.  Id.
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monetary compensation to the other party for the loss sustained by 
him in consequence of the breach . . . .111
On this view a contract creates a primary obligation to perform. The 
obligation to pay damages is a secondary duty. Analogously, we 
might say that the law of torts imposes primary duties to exercise 
due care or not harm others with ultrahazardous substances. When 
these duties are breached, a secondary duty to pay damages arises. 
 This distinction can be deployed against the arguments put for-
ward by Pollock and expanded on in the preceding section by pointing 
out that when a plaintiff files his pleadings, he is only alleging the 
breach of primary duties. Likewise, the breach of these duties and 
the consequences of that breach are the only things at issue in a civil 
litigation. Because the duty to pay damages is a secondary duty, it 
makes perfect sense that it is not the subject of pleading or proof 
in litigation. 
 Taking the Austinian framework for granted, however, it is still 
not clear that the secondary rights and duties involved in a civil 
wrong consist of a duty to pay damages. At best, the argument above 
explains why the failure to tender damages does not constitute an 
element of the wrongs of breach of contract or tort. The question re-
mains, however, whether the effect of a wrong is a secondary duty by 
the contract breacher or tortfeasor to pay damages or a secondary 
right of the plaintiff to act against the defendant and extract wealth 
from him or her. At this point, all of the arguments marshaled above 
regarding remedies can be employed again, this time in defense of 
the more nuanced claim that there is no secondary duty to pay dam-
ages, only a secondary right to act against the defendant. 
 It is also worth noting that it is not clear that all corrective justice 
theorists would be comfortable employing the framework of primary 
and secondary duties to defend their theory. Ernest Weinrib seems to 
reject the distinction between primary and secondary rights and du-
ties, at least insofar as it is applied to private law remedies.112 In a 
recent essay, Two Concepts of Remedies, he contrasts the Aristotelian 
conception of remedies with that put forward by Hans Kelsen.113 Ac-
cording to Weinrib, Aristotle offered what he calls a “reason concep-
 111.  Id.; see also Moschi v. Lep Air Servs. Ltd., [1973] A.C. 331 (H.L.) (Diplock L.J.) 
(setting forth the distinction between primary and secondary duties in contract); R. V. 
Ward, Ltd. v. Bignall, [1967] 1 Q.B. 534 (Diplock L.J.) (same); London & Thames Haven Oil 
Wharves Ltd. v. Attwooll, [1967] Ch. 772 (Diplock L.J.) (same); Robophone Facilities, Ltd. 
v. Blank, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1428 (C.A.) (Diplock L.J.) (same); C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos, 
[1966] 2 Q.B. 695 (C.A.) (Diplock L.J.) (same); Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk Agric. & 
Poultry Producers Ass’n, Ltd. [1966] 1 All E.R. 309 (C.A.) (Diplock L.J.) (same). 
 112.  See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Two Conceptions of Remedies, in JUSTIFYING PRI-
VATE LAW REMEDIES 3 (Charles E.F. Rickett ed., 2008).   
 113.  See id. at 6 (“This juxtaposition of Aristotle and Kelsen brings out the contrast be-
tween what we may call the ‘reason conception’ and the ‘condition conception’ of remedies.”). 
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tion” of remedies.114 On this view, remedial duties are simply the ex-
tension of the original duties whose violation is the subject of suit.115
For example, if a person has a right to be free of the wrongful de-
struction of his property by another, that right does not cease to exist 
simply because it is violated by a tortfeasor. In this regard, Weinrib 
writes: “The survival of the right means that the duty correlative to it 
also survives. . . . Just as the plaintiff’s right continues, so the duty 
correlative to that right continues. As with the right, the content of 
the duty has been transformed by the defendant’s tort.”116 Continuing 
the argument, he asserts: 
Just as the plaintiff’s right is no longer embodied in the specific ob-
ject, which has been destroyed, but in an entitlement to receive the 
object’s equivalent from the defendant, so the defendant’s duty is 
no longer to abstain from its destruction, which has already taken 
place, but to provide the plaintiff with the object’s equivalent.117
In contrast, in Kelsen’s view the initial wrong is not a reason for the 
remedy, but merely the condition for its application.118 The “charac-
teristic of the condition conception [is] that the remedy granted in 
any case serves purposes unrelated to the reason(s) for the imposition 
of the liability in the first place.”119 While Weinrib does not explicitly 
link his discussion to Austin’s framework, Peter Birks has spoken of 
the distinction between primary and secondary rights and duties in 
terms similar to those that Weinrib attributes to Kelsen’s theory. “It 
is essential to the understanding of the nature of civil wrongs,” writes 
Birks, “to dispel the illusion that compensation and such wrongs are 
intrinsically connected.”120 Hence, in defending his Aristotelian con-
ception of private law, Weinrib seems to foreclose the possibility of 
invoking Austin’s distinction as a defense.121
 114.  Id.
 115.  See id. at 12 (discussing the role of remedies in the reason conception). 
 116.  Id.
 117.  Id. at 12-13. 
 118.  Id. at 7.  
 119.  Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120.  Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
TORT LAW 31, 36 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). In The Concept of a Civil Wrong, Birks does 
not invoke Austin’s distinction, but he has done so in other work, making essentially the 
same point. See Birks, supra note 105, at 15 (“The rights which we ultimately enforce 
through the machinery of execution are not the rights which we stand on in making our 
claims in court.”). 
 121.  It is not clear at this point, however, if Weinrib is defending the idea of corrective 
justice as an independent normative justification. As Stephen Smith has pointed out, the 
approach set forth in Two Conceptions of Remedies does not seem to require any notion of 
corrective justice. The remedial right is simply an extension of the original right to be free 
of tortious behavior, have one’s contracts performed, and the like. See Stephen A. Smith, 
Why Courts Make Orders (And What This Tells Us About Damages), 64 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 51, 82 n.59 (2011).   
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 The second objection is to argue that the apparent absence of a 
duty to pay damages is simply a result of the historical accident that 
law courts provided remedies via a sheriff’s ability to levy against 
property while the equity courts employed orders backed by the 
threat of contempt.122 These are simply two ways of enforcing the du-
ty to pay, and nothing should turn on whether one employs one rem-
edy or the other. This objection has a superficial plausibility. It is cer-
tainly true that the examples of duties to pay damages marshaled in 
the preceding section arise out of equity rather than law.123
 It is not true, however, that the common law was without reme-
dies that coerced performance rather than simply allowing the at-
tachment of property. For example, an action of replevin forced one in 
wrongful possession of goods to return the goods to their rightful 
owner.124 Likewise, the action of ejectment allowed the rightful owner 
of land to force one in wrongful possession to vacate the property.125
In addition, at one point in its history the common law did create a 
duty to pay one’s debts on pain of imprisonment.126 The last debtor’s 
prison in England, however, was closed in 1862.127 More pointedly, 
many American states have constitutional provisions that specifically 
outlaw imprisonment for the nonpayment of debt.128 Indeed, courts 
have held that the debts discussed above—such as child support and 
alimony—that give rise to a threat of imprisonment are in some way 
extraordinary and therefore not within the scope of these constitu-
 122.  See DOBBS, supra note 86, § 4.3(1), at 586-89 (noting the different powers of equity 
and law courts use in fashioning remedies). 
 123.  See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. 
 124.  See F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 39, 50 (A.H. Chaytor 
& W.J. Whittaker eds., 1936) (outlining the history of replevin). 
 125.  See id. at 46-50 (discussing the history of ejectment action).  
 126.  See Ressler, supra note 96, at 359-62 (describing the history of imprisonment for 
debt in England). 
 127.  See id. at 362 (“ ‘The last jail in England exclusively for debtors—the Queen’s 
Prison—closed in 1862 and was demolished in 1868.’ ” (quoting THE OXFORD HISTORY OF 
THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 277 (Norval Morris & 
David J. Rothman eds., 1998)).  
 128.  The following state constitutional provisions explicitly prohibit imprisonment for 
debt: ALA. CONST. art. I, § 20; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 17; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 18; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 16; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 10; 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 12; FLA. CONST. art 
I, § 11; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XXIII; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 19; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 15; 
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 14; IND. CONST. art. I, § 22; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 19; KAN. CONST. B. of 
Rights, § 16; KY. CONST. B. of Rights, § 18; MD. CONST. art. III, § 38; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 
21; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 12; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 30; MO. CONST. art. I, § 11; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 27; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 20; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 
13; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 21; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 28; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 15; OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 15; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 13; OR. CONST. art. I, § 19; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 11; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 19; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 15; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 
18; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 16; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 40; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17; WIS. CONST.
art. I, § 16; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 5.  
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tional prohibitions.129 This suggests, however, that they are in fact 
different than ordinary debts, giving rise to special duties not other-
wise present. 
 The third argument is to claim that there is a duty to pay damag-
es but it is an imperfect duty, one that does not give rise to enforce-
ment by the state unless the plaintiff insists. In support of this claim, 
one might point to the fact that judges often speak of a duty to pay 
damages.130 This point can be coupled with Hart’s critique of Austin’s 
theory of legal obligation. Recall that Austin insisted that the law 
consisted of nothing more than orders of the sovereign backed up by 
threats.131 Hart argued that Austin’s formulation neglected to take 
account of law from the internal point of view.132 From this point of 
view, law is more than simply a system of sanctions.133 It also claims 
authority and offers reasons for action independent of any threat of 
sanctions.134 Accordingly, one could say that the law imposes a duty 
to pay one’s debts. Even if a third party representing the state does 
not enforce that duty, the law nevertheless declares such a duty to 
exist, thus giving those subject to its authority a reason to pay up. 
 The problem with this approach is that it fails to explain the role 
of plaintiffs in contract or tort litigation. They are seen as enforcing a 
duty, but it is not clear that corrective justice offers us a reason as to 
why plaintiffs rather than prosecutors should enforce this duty. One 
might argue that plaintiffs enjoy the particular status that they do 
because the wrongs involved in private law are peculiarly relational 
wrongs.135 The relationality of the wrong, however, explains why 
damages should be paid to plaintiffs. It does not explain why plain-
tiffs are uniquely empowered to bring suits. For example, we are left 
with the question of why money damages are not enforced with a re-
gime analogous to that used by whistleblower statutes, where anyone 
 129.  See Annotation, Alimony or Maintenance as Debt Within Constitutional or Statu-
tory Provisions Against Imprisonment for Debt, 30 A.L.R. 130 (1924) (listing cases holding 
that imprisonment for nonpayment of alimony is not barred by constitutional provisions 
against imprisonment for debt). 
 130.  See, e.g., Bigby v. United States, 188 U.S. 400, 409 (1902) (noting “duty to pay 
damages”); Gonzalez v. Denning, 394 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 2004) (same); Horwitz-
Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).  
 131.  See AUSTIN, supra note 32, at 13 (“Every law or rule (taken with the largest signi-
fication which can be given to the term properly) is a command.”). 
 132.  See HART, supra note 32, at 88 (“What the external point of view, which limits 
itself to the observable regularities of behaviour, cannot reproduce is the way in which the 
rules function as rules in the lives of those who normally are the majority of society.”). 
 133.  See id. at 79-80 (noting the problems with Austin’s theory). 
 134.  See id. at 48 (“Secondly, other statutes are unlike orders in that they do not re-
quire persons to do things, but may confer powers on them; they do not impose duties but 
offer facilities for the free creation of legal rights and duties within the coercive framework 
of the law.”). 
 135.  See WEINRIB, supra note 8, at 56-83 (discussing corrective justice and the idea of 
relational wrongs). 
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with information of wrongdoing can bring suit to seek compensation 
and is paid a modest bounty in return.136
 The duty to pay damages, if it exists, thus has a rather strange 
character. If this duty exists and is grounded in corrective justice, 
that theory fails to explain the plaintiff-centered remedial machinery 
that we currently have. Yet, the strongest argument in favor of posit-
ing such a duty would rest on the idea of the law’s transparency. On 
this view, any successful interpretive theory of law must account for 
the way in which participants speak about the law, and judges do 
speak as though there is a duty to pay one’s debts.137 Without ques-
tioning the validity of the transparency criterion—and there are rea-
sons to question it138—we are left with a quandary. We can “save” ju-
dicial language but only at the cost of rendering much of our actual 
remedial law mysterious. Unless one subscribes to the implausible 
belief that the common law and its expositors are always absolutely 
consistent, even the most dedicated partisan of the transparency cri-
terion will have to admit a certain opacity in the law. That being the 
case, it seems that an interpretive theory that abandons a certain 
amount of judicial dicta in order to capture the basic structure of re-
medial law ought to be preferred on transparency grounds to a theory 
that doggedly explains judicial dicta while rendering a complex body 
of operative rules opaque.  
VI.   CONCLUSION
 There is no duty to pay damages in a tort or contract suit. This 
claim may seem odd to many, but it accords quite well with our cur-
rent law. Rather than imposing such a duty, the common law em-
powers the plaintiff to act against a liable defendant, extracting 
wealth from him if the plaintiff wishes. This structure is more con-
sistent with civil recourse theory than the demands of corrective jus-
tice. Of course, this Article’s conclusion does not lay the competing 
claims of these theories to rest, but it does provide an additional rea-
son for believing that civil recourse provides a better interpretation of 
the private law than does corrective justice. 
 136.  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006) (allowing individuals to file lawsuits against contractors 
who defraud the federal government and receive a portion of the proceeds). See also Oman, 
supra note 4, at 562 (discussing the possibility of enforcing duties to compensate with qui 
tam like actions). 
 137.  See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 24-32 (2004) (discussing the transpar-
ency criteria in theories of contract law). 
 138.  See Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
1490-96 (2005) (criticizing the application of the transparency criterion to economic theo-
ries of contract law); Oman, supra note 4, at 566-71 (arguing that the transparency criteria 
makes limited demands on a successful interpretive theory of the law). 
